It is argued that the usual postulates of quantum mechanics are too strong. It is conjectured that it is possible to interpret all experiments if we maintain the formalism of quantum theory without modification, but weaken the postulates concerning the relation between the formalism and the experiments. A set of postulates is proposed where realism is insured. Comments on Bell´s theorem are made in the light of the new postulates.
I. Introduction
After the discovery of quantum mechanics a warm debate took place about its interpretation, but since 1927 the Copenhagen interpretation (CI), due to Bohr, dominated in the scientific community and the debate almost ceased, although a few critical voices remained like Einstein and Schrödinger (see 1 for reprints of the relevant papers of that period). But it is interesting that the CI was not understood in the same way by different people. In particular Bohr did not attempt to apply quantum mechanics to the macroscopic domain, whilst von Neumann did it, 2 and even made a model of measurement on this basis. The debate reappeared with Bohm's work in 1952 and, with more strength, after Bell's paper in 1964 3 and it lasts until today. In the last few decades the CI has been progresively abandoned and the so-called many worlds interpretation (MWI) is taken its place, specially amongst cosmologists on the one hand and workers in quantum information on the other. I include in MWI the interpretations in terms of decoherence 4 or consistent histories, 5 in my opinion they are just (important) elaborations within MWI. Still, some people claim that no interpretation is really needed. 6 The reason for the variety of interpretations of quantum mechanics is that many predictions of the theory have a paradoxical character, and people have attemped to solve these paradoxes by different means, without complete success till now in my opinion.
In my view the first step towards a satisfactory solution of the paradoxes is to investigate what is the minimal set of postulates of quantum mechanics which are really indispensable for the interpretation of observations and experiments. In some sense this approach is what the CI attempted and it is close to the "no-interpretation" above mentioned. 6 However, at a difference with the merely instrumentalist (pragmatic, sometimes named positivistic) character of the CI, I propose including the requirement that quantum mechanics is universal and realistic. By universal I mean that quantum mechanics applies to both the microscopic and the macroscopic domain (although maybe not to the universe as a whole, see below). This contrasts with the CI (at least Bohr´s) view that the referent of the theory is always the union of a microscopic system plus a macroscopic context (including the measuring apparatus), but the macroscopic systems should be treated according to classical theories.
Realistic means that we assume that physics (or science in general) makes assertions about the world and not only about the results of observations or experiments. In particular this implies that we shall give an ignorance interpretation to the probabilities predicted by the theory, at least the probabilities about properties of macroscopic bodies. In order to expose my proposal I shall divide this paper in five parts with the following aims:
1) Pointing out that a part of the postulates of quantum theory are unnecessarily strong, 2) Analyzing some experiments in order to discover what postulates are really indispensable, 3) Proposing new postulates leading to a minimal realistic interpretation, 4) Studying the relation with other interpretations: Copenhagen, many worlds and hidden variables, 5) Showing, with the example of Bell´s theorem, how the conceptual problems are alleviated.
II. The standard postulates of quantum mechanics
Any theory of physics contains a (mathematical) formalism plus postulates giving the connection with observations or experiments (semantical rules). In quantum mechanics the formalism is the theory of Hilbert spaces combined with relativistic (Lorentz) invariance plus some particular postulates (e.g. masses and coupling constants of elementary particles). (Following a common practice I shall speak about "quantum mechanics" in the rest of this article, but I really mean "quantum theory". Also it is known that quantum fields cannot be formulated in Hilbert spaces, but require the more general framwork of C* algebras, but I shall ignore this point of mathematical rigour).
Most textbooks do not attempt to make precise the connection of the formalism with the observations or experiments, but we might try to divide the traditional semantical rules in two classes:
1) The correspondences operators-observables and vectors-states. They establish that we must associate a vector of an appropriate Hilbert space to every state of a physical system, and a self-adjoint operator to every observable. This statement alone gives very little information about the connection of the formalism with the experiments because no mention is made of the values of the physical quantities. It should be necessarily complemented with postulates about the measurement.
2) The theory of measurement, which establish that "when we measure the observable associated to the operator A in the state with vector (wavefunction) ψ we obtain one of the eigenvalues of A, say a j , with probability | ψ | ψ j | 2 ". It is increasingly obvious that we should not postulate a theory of mesurement. The measurement is just an interaction between some physical system and a macroscopic apparatus and therefore the study of the measurement should be derived from the remaining postulates if quantum mechanics is to be regarded as a fundamental theory of nature. The problem of including the measurement within the postulates of a theory is that makes it subjective and ambiguous. Because, what is really a measurement?, at what time is it made exactly?, a bad experiment, would not give results in disagreement with those postulated ?. These, and other arguments, have been brillantly exposed by John Bell, who proposed even the removal of the word "measurement" from physical theories.
3 Nevertheless it is a fact that the relation between operators and observables in quantum mechanics is always stated with reference to the possible values which may be obtained in measurements. This fact contrast with the situation in classical physics, for instance classical statistical mechanics. In that theory we also associate states of physical systems to some elements of the theory, namely probability distributions in phase space. Also we associate observables with other elements, namely functions of the phase space variables. The semantical rules are complete when we assume that all variables have values simultaneously and give an ignorance interpretation to the probabilies. But a similar procedure cannot be used in quantum mechanics as explained in the following.
According to the quantum-mechanical formalism, combined with the standard correspondence between measurable values of the dinamical variables and the eigenvalues of the corresponding operators, the variables cannot have a value when they are not measured. Indeed this is the essential containt of the Kochen-Specker theorem (see e.g. 7 or 8 ). Consequently we cannot make statements about observables outside the context of a measurement, which contradicts the desire of removing the theory of measurement. I think that the existence of several, quite different, interpretations of quantum mechanics derives from that difficulty. CI (Bohr´s) assumes that the connection formalism-experiments should always involve macroscopic apparatuses which must be treated according to classical physics. This implies that macroscopic variables do possess values independently of measurement, and the postulates refer to these objective values. John von Neumann´s interpretation (included in CI by some people) is actually different. It does not attribute values to macroscopic variables from the start, but assumes that there is a "collapse of the wavefunction" which objectifies the values (maybe by the action of the mind or consciousness of a human observer). MWI solves the problem with an appeal to many branches of the "wavefunction of the universe", all relevant variables having values in each individual branch. But for me all these interpretations are unsatisfactory. CI, both Bohr´s and von Neumann´s, because it establish an "infamous boundary" between the macro and the microscopic domain (or between matter and mind). MWI because it contains assumptions which cannot be tested empirically and, in addition, look rather bizarre (a copy of each observer lives in every branch of the universe´s wavefunction). This is why I am proposing an alternative having elements of both, CI and MWI, but trying to remove their difficulties.
At this moment a comment of mathematical character is in order. As is well known, in the standard approach the states of physical systems are associated to vectors of the Hilbert space and the observables to self-adjoing operators. Actually a generalization is possible if we associate observables to normalized positive operator valued (POV) measures. 9 On the other hand, all vectors which are obtained by multiplication of a given vector times complex numbers are assumed to represent the same state. Therefore it is appropriate to speak about rays of the Hilbert space rather than about vectors. Nevertheless, I shall retain the more common, although mathematically less correct, use of the words vector and operator because here I am putting the emphasis in the conceptual, philosophical, questions rather than in the formal, mathematical, ones.
Let us look more closely to the correspondence states-vectors and observables-selfadjoing operators. They are usually assumed (explicitly or implicitly) to be one to one, except for the superselection rules. The one-to-one character of the states-vectors correspondence is sometimes named superposition principle and it is enuntiated "if two vectors correspond to states, any vector which is a linear combination of the former also corresponds to a state, except for the superselection rules". Actually if the correspondence rays-states is one to one, also the correspondence observables-selfadjoing operators is one to one and viceversa. (This result is related to Gleason´s theorem 7 ). In my opinion such postulates are unnecessarily strong and even absurd, because if we assume that every self-adjoint operator represents an observable, we are making postulates about "what may be measured in principle, that is what could be achieved in the laboratory in a more or less distant future". I think that the correspondence can be only in one direction, and so is stated in carefull textbooks. That is, we might assume that for every possible state which may be found in nature or manufactured in the laboratory there is an associated vector, and that for every observable which can actually be measured there is a self-adjoint operator, but not viceversa. This may be represented as follows states → vectors, observables →self-adjoint operators. However, this correspondence is still too strong in my opinion. We should just admit states → density matrices, dynamical variables → self-adjoint operators That is, states should be associated to density operators and only rarely the density operators would correspond to vectors in Hilbert space, the socalled pure states . Also we should speak about dynamical variables rather than observables, because observability is a practical question which should not be postulated for all dinamical variables. A more precise statement of the postulates which I propose will be made in section 4, but in order to motivate them I shall mention a few typical experiments.
III. The interpretation of experiments
In the following I consider some experiments in order to see that rather weak postulates are indispensable:
1.Static properties of atoms, nuclei, molecules and solids.
Probably the most dramatic qualitative and (modulo some unavoidable approximations due to the complexity of the calculations) quantitive success of quantum theory is the interpretation of the physics of atoms, nuclei, molecules and solids, in particular their static properties. For instance, the prediction of the form, size and binding energy of molecules or crystals (hence their stability), the electric and magnetic properties (if external fields are included), etc., is the basis for most of theoretical chemistry and solid state physics.
In order to get these predictions from quantum mechanics, it is enough to take into account the evolution of the Schrödinger (or Schrödinger-Pauli) equation for electrons and nuclei, coupled to quantized Maxwell equations for the electromagnetic field. If we impose appropriate boundary conditions (e.g. no radiation coming from infinity), we may derive the existence of an unique stationary state ("the ground state"). Therefore, there is no need to postulate that the ground state is the eigenstate of the Schrödinger equation with the lowest eigenvalue, this fact following from the formalism. After that, the solution of the stationary Schrödinger equation gives all the required information, provided we assume that the expectation value of the energy of the system is given by the standard rule
where H is the Hamiltonian operator and Ψ the vector state. In particular it is not necessary to assume that all self-adjoint operators represent observables, or that all eigenvectors of the Hamiltonian represent physical states. Similar arguments apply to the static properties of atoms or nuclei.
Collisions.
For the study of (elastic or inelastic) scattering it is enough to consider the evolution of two or more systems (atoms, molecules, nuclei,...), both in the ground state, which initially are at a macroscopic distance and approach each other. Aside from the quantum evolution equations plus postulates of classical physics for the interpretation of the final results, we only need rules for preparation of the initial state and the interpretation of the final state.
The initial state usually consists of a beam whose preparation may be described in terms of classical physics (e. g. a macroscopic accelerator). Hence we should derive the density matrix corresponding to the (usually microscopic) quantum systems in the incoming beam and the detector. Nevertheless I do not think that it is possible to propose any general postulate saying how to do that. We should use the method or trial and error with the only general rule that that the appropriate density matrix is the one havint the greatest von Neumann entropy compatible with our information. After that we must use the quantum formalism in order to compute the evolution of the initial density matrix until the detector. Then we should apply to the detection process the quantum formalism, which most times could be approximated by classical equations. At the end we arrive at a density matrix for the final state of the measuring apparatus. Decoherence theory 4 shows that the apparatus density matrix is, to a very good approximation, diagonal in the coordinates representation. That density matrix is interpreted as a probability distribution (with the ignorance interpretation.) I think that this is the way how physicists in labs actually interpret the collision experiments.
This interpretation is very good for all practical purposes ( FAPP), but presents a fundamental difficulty (Bell pointed out the important difference between FAPP and fundamental assertions 3 ). In fact the final density matrix of the measuring apparatus is only approximately, but not exactly, diagonal. Therefore either we renounce to the interpretation of its diagonal elements as true probabilities (this should be the position of MWI) or we break quantum mechanics at the macroscopic level (this would be the position of CI). My position departs from both MWI and CI by assuming that quantum mechanics itself is an approximation to a more fundamental theory not yet known. An extremely good approximation, indeed. I eleborate more on that below.
Spectroscopy.
This technique gives rise to the most spectacular agreement between quantum predictions and experimental results, the precision being sometimes better than 1 part in 10
9 . This happens, e.g. in atomic spectra with visible light (electronic transitions) or microwaves (hyperfine transitions). The experiments of atomic spectroscopy are frequently interpreted as measurements of the energy levels of atoms. However, that interpretation is not necessary (although some people argüe that it is suggested by the formalism). We may simply assume that we are dealing with the evolution, governed by the quantum equations, of a beam of incoming radiation interacting with a material system (atom, nucleus, etc.). After all spectroscopy is a particular example of scattering experiment where a light beam is substituted for the incoming beam of particles. Both the incoming light and the outgoing light may be usually treated as classical.
Interference.
These experiments are currently taken as the most dramatic examples of non-classical (quantum) behaviour. Nevertheless we need rather weak postulates for their interpretation. Again, it is enough to know the initial state, the evolution (including the interaction of microobjects with macro or mesoscopic devices like a grating or a detector) and the interpretation of the final results as in collision experiments (e.g. interpretation of what wee see in a photographic plate as blackening of grains by the action of the incoming particles). We do not need to speak about whether a particle goes through one or both slits.
In all these examples we see that the standard postulates about the existence of discrete energy states, and their correspondence with vectors in Hilbert space, or about the association of observables with operators, are not really necessary. This leads us to conjecture that the (mathematical) formalism of quantum mechanics, the standard postulates of macroscopic physics for the connection formalism-experiments, plus some particular hypotheses (like the assumption that an atom consists of a nucleus plus electrons) are sufficient for the interpretation of all experiments.
Of course, for the applications it is more economical to use some "practical recipes", like Feynman's rule of summing probability amplitudes of indistinguishable paths in experiments of interference, but summing probabilities if the paths are distinguishable. The problem is that conceptual difficulties arise when the practical rules are taken as postulates. For example, the waveparticle duality appears as highly counterintuitive in experiments showing, alternatively, recombination and anticorrelation. In a typical experiment 10 one sends "individual photons" to a beam-splitter and verifies anticorrelated detection, that is either the detector in the transmitted beam or the detector in the reflected beam fires, but not both. This apparently proves the corpuscular nature of the photon. However, recombination of the two beams gives rise to interference, which apparently shows that the photon has gone by both paths at the same time. The experiment appears as mind boggling because it cannot be explained either assuming that something travels along both paths or assuming that there is propagation only along one path. However, there are alternative interpretations where something real (an electromagnetic field actually) propagates by the two paths, which explains interference, but some mechanism prevents the firing of both detectors at the same time, which explains anticorrelated detection.
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Another crucial point of our proposed approach is that it is not necessary to postulate the existence of discrete energy states of quantum systems. Such states may be just mathematical intermediates in the calculation of the evolution. This is the case, for instance, with Fock states of the radiation field (e.g. single photon states). The states appear as mathematical constructs, not necessarily representing anything real, and are similar to the Fourier components in the standard solution of linear partial differential equations. A typical example of these is the diffusion equation, where the Fourier components of the series solution may not be positive definite and this does not imply that probabilities are negative, because only the sum of the series rep-resents a probability. (There is a difference with the Schrödinger equation, however, in the fact that no theorem of positivity exists here, similar to the theorem stating that the fundamental solution of a diffusion equation is always positive.)
The moral of our analysis is that the standard postulates of quantum mechanics (in particular the universal correspondence between vectors and states) constrains the possible interpretations of quantum mechanics. My conjecture is that weaker postulates may allow for alternative interpretations free from conceptual difficulties.
IV. Proposed postulates
Firstly I admit without any change the usual formalism of quantum theory (Hilbert space, equations of Dirac, Klein-Gordon, Maxwell, etc.)
The postulates of connection with experiments are reduced to: 1) To every physical system we associate a Hilbert space in the standard form.
2) To every "preparation" we associate a density operator. A preparation is a set of well specified laboratory manipulations. But I claim that it is necessary to specify the actual operations and the full macroscopic context. It is not enough to say, for instance, "I take a pair of photons of such and such properties". We should say something like "I take a crystal of specified kind, cut in such or such form, at which we direct a laser with specified properties", etc. That is we should specify the full macroscopic context. States are defined by the preparation like chemical species are defined by the recipe for obtaining them in the laboratory (either extracting them from natural products or by synthesis). Thus I propose that 2') The density operator corresponding to a preparation is the one having maximum von Neumann entropy compatible with our knowledge about the system. I do not make any distinction between "pure states" and "mixtures", but claim that we shall treat them on the same footing. I do not assume that there is a physically realizable state corresponding to every vector in Hilbert space. In this sense I reject the standard form of the superposition principle. However the break which I consider for that principle is not of the "superselection rule" type, but deeper. My conjecture is that, in most cases, physical states will have a positive (nonzero) von Neumann entropy, pure states being just mathematical constructs. But I do not propose this condition as a postulate, I want just to remove the postulate that the opposite is true. In any case I do not assume that "pure states" provide a complete information about a single system, but about an ensemble of systems (i. e. those corresponding to a given preparation procedure). In this sense my proposal may be classified within the so-called statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics 12 I do not postulate anything about observables (e.g. that the possible values obtained in a measurement are the eigenvalues of some selfadjoint operator). But I do not claim that such statements cannot be a part of the theory, I only claim that all statements of that kind, if true, should be derived from the remaining postulates. Observable is anything that can be actually observed (measured). Therefore the observables should be defined by a specific method of measurement. And measurement is a physical interaction which should be studied using the remaining postulates of quantum theory.
We should look at the process of measurement as follows. We have a system prepared in a specified form (that is, in some "state" represented by a density operator) and an experimental (macroscopic) context, also represented by a density operator. Both the system and the context evolve in interaction until they arrive at a final state. At the end of the measurement we observe a macroscopic system and this observation does not require special postulates (in addition to those of classical physics). Any macroscopic apparatus is in contact with the environment (it is always an open systems) and it is possible to prove 13 that the evolution gives, after a long enough time, a reduced density matrix (resulting from taking the partial trace with respect to the environment) which is diagonal in the coordinates representation for the macroscopic variables (e.g. the center of mass of macroscopic bodies).
Finnally we need an objectification postulate, which is required for a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. That is we must state what elements of the theory correspond to elements of reality, in contrast with elements of the theory which are just mathematical constructs useful for the formulation of the theory. An example of the former is the distance between two macroscopic bodies, an example of the latter is a vector in a Hilbert space. For a complete theory it is necessary that every element of physical reality has a counterpart in the theory, but I do not assume that quantum me-chanics is complete.
14 Thus I shall not attempt to specify the elements of the theory which correspond to every element of reality. I shall do that for some of the elements of reality, namely positions of bodies. Still I do not want to make claims about the reality of quantum particles, like electrons or photons. Maybe the said particles are just useful mathematical constructs. Consequently I shall postulate only the objective reality for the position of macroscopic bodies, as follows:
3) The center of mass of any macroscopic body, or any macroscopic part of it, has a definite position in space at every time. The probability distribution of positions is give by Born´s rule, that is it equals the modulus squared of the wave function in the position representation.
Certainly this postulate is open to criticism. Firstly the word macroscopic has not a sharp meaning. A solution (admittedly not very good) is to define as macroscopic any system with mass greater than, say, one microgram. Another possible criticism is that the postulate refers directly to macroobjects. Now, postulates about macroscopic objects may be derived from postulates about microobjects, but the inverse process is not trivial. Therefore finding the consequences of our three postulates for the microscopic domain (the one most properly quantal) may be difficult or impossible. I am aware of these problems, but in my view they are less dramatic than the difficulties associated to CI or MWI, as commented above. Also I suppose that the difficulties of my approach are related to the fact that quantum mechanics is an approximation of a more fundamental theory. This is suggested by the fact that the conceptual difficulties are alleviated when we pass from (elementary) quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. For instance the stationary states with sharp energy which appear in the solution of Schrödinger equation are rather bizarre, but it is known that the states are neither stationary nor sharp in energy when the interaction with the quantized radiation field is taken into account. My conjecture is that a fundamental theory free from interpretational difficulties will be obtained only when the unification of quantum field theory and general relativity is achieved.
Our third postulate implies that the reduced quantum density matrix of macroscopic variables should be interpreted as a probability distribution. That is we propose an ignorance interpretation of the density matrix, which cannot be derived either in the CI or in the MWI. In fact, in both approaches a fundamental value is attributed to "pure states" of physical systems. They correspond to vectors (more correctly rays or, equivalently, idempotent density matrices) of the Hilbert space, whilst only non-idempotent density matrices are seen as associated to lack of information. As is well known this leads to the impossibility of objectification as correctly stressed by P. Mittelstaedt.
9
In my proposal all density matrices representing actual states have an operational meaning (including those corresponding to rays if any): They are associated to physically realizable preparations, and they take account of the actual information that we have about the system. In this sense we leave open the possibility that the information is incomplete, even about a system represented by a "quantum pure state", that is we leave open the possibility of hidden variables. Furthermore, our objectification postulate requires that the initial information about the system to be measured is already incomplete, although I shall not elaborate further on this point in this paper. Another consequence of the objectification postulate is to view decoherence 4 as a loss of information closely similar to the "coarse graining" which happens in classical physics when we average over the degrees of freedom which are out of our control.
In my approach the concept of "state" has an epistemological, rather than ontological, character. States are rather similar to the probability distributions (ensembles) used in classical statistical mechanics. They refer to our knowledge about the system. However, that knowledge has a fundamentally objective character because it rests upon an objectively defined preparation procedure. The lack of ontological commitement derives from my rejection of statements of principle. That is I consider meaningless expressions like "the maximum information which may be obtained in principle". The actual information is what matters.
V. Relation with Copenhagen, many worlds and hidden variables interpretations
The approach here presented has some similarities with the CI and also with the MWI but, at a difference with these, it allows (almost requests) for hidden variables. Let us analyze in some detail these points.
With the Copenhagen interpretation I share: 1) the emphasis on the need of speaking always about the macroscopic context, and 2) an operational approach to state (preparation) and observable (measurement). Indeed, I propose to remove all postulates relating directly the elements of the theory (electrons, photons, etc.) with actual physical objects. In this sense the postulates about the connection formalism-experiments refer always to a (possibly microscopic) system plus its macroscopic context as in the CI. In some sense the proposed postulates go farther than Heisenberg, for whom it is nonsense to speak about trajectories of electrons. The proposed intepretation avoids even assuming from the start that the electron itself (or the photon, etc.) is a real object, although I do not assume the opposite either. In the proposed minimal realist interpretation the microscopic entities are assumed to be "theoretical (human) constructs" useful for the description of nature at the microscopic level, although they are related to some objective reality.
However there are three sharp differences between this approach and the CI: 1) I assume that the formalism of quantum mechanics should be applied both to micro and to macroscopic bodies, in contrast with CI (at least with Bohr´s view), 2) I do not exclude the existence of a subquantum level (hidden variables) which in the future might be accesible to our knowledge, and 3) related to this is the fact that the proposed interpretation is not considered the final word, it is just a provisional one to be used until we have a more fundamental theory.
With the MWI (or relative state interpretation) I share the assumption of the full validity of the quantum formalism even for the macroscopic world. However, the objectification postulate implies that the macroscopic variables always possess values (all macroscopic measurements may be reduced to position measurements). But the objectification postulate applies to a reduced density operator, obtained by taking the partial trace with respect to the environment. Consequently it does not apply to the whole universe, which has no environment. Also, as mentioned above, I do not postulate any fundamental relevance for the "quantum pure states", which seems to be a (maybe implicit) assumption of the MWI.
VI. Quantum mechanics and local realism: Bell's theorem.
It seems obvious, at least to me, that the best interpretation of quantum mechanics would be in terms of local hidden variables, if this were possible.
(More properly, it would be desirable to have a local realist substitute for quantum mechanics, in a similar way that general reltivity is a local substitute for Newtonian gravitation. I believe that this was Einstein´s desideratum). Consequently Bell´s theorem is the biggest problem for a satisfactory interpretation of quantum mechanics. But I claim that local hidden variables have not yet been excluded by performed experiments (see below.)
The proof of Bell's theorem requires to assume that there are states such that: 1) they are physically realizable in the laboratory, and 2) they violate a Bell inequality . As I do not admit as a postulate of quantum mechanics the realizability of any particular state, the derivation of the theorem would involve proving that such state may be produced. That is I demand a detailed prosposal of an experiment where such state may be manufactured before a rigorous claim may be made about the incompatibility of local realism with the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, a detailed experimental proposal is proved to be truly reliable only when the experiment is actually made. Consequently no claim of incompatibility may be made until such experiment is performed.
In the meantime Bell´s is a purely mathematical theorem (purely means without direct implications for the real world) that shows the incompatibility between two formalisms: 1) the Hilbert space formalism plus the postulate that all vectors correspond to states which may be physically realized (except for the superselection rules), and 2) the Bell formalism for local hidden variables theories. This does not mean that Bell's theorem is irrelevant. On the contrary, I think that it is one of the most important discoveries in the physics of the 20th century. But its relevance consists of being a guide for possible experiments able to test quantum theory versus local realism. As is well known (or rather, it should be well known) no (loophole-free) experiment has been performed able to refute local realism up to now. It is remarkable that this happens more than forty years after Bell´s work, which shows that the empirical disrproof of local realism is not a trivial matter. Actually the optical photon experiments are unable to truly test the Bell inequalities due to the detection loophole. 15 More suitable seem to be experiments with atomic qubits. One such experiment has already been performed, 16 but it did not close the locality loophole and presents other difficulties.
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My conjecture is that no experiment will ever refute quantum mechanics. But I also guess that decoherence and other sources of noise (e.g. quantum zeropoint fluctuations) might prevent the violation of local realism. That is, I still believe that quantum mechanics and local hidden variables are compatible, provided we define quantum mechanics with a set of postulates far weaker than is made usually, in the line shown in this paper.
